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Abstract 
There is a growing phenomenon of brand advocacy, where brands pressure a producer 
country government to take pro-worker actions such as respecting the rights of activists and 
raising minimum wages. This article examines the potential and limits of brand advocacy by 
developing a conceptual framework and analysing three recent cases of brand advocacy in 
Cambodia’s garment industry. The study shows that brands’ action and influence are shaped 
by issue salience, mobilization structures, political opportunities/contexts, and resource 
dependency. This article makes both empirical and theoretical contributions. This is one of the 
first studies delving into the advocacy role of brands in promoting labour rights and 
conditions vis-a-vis government. Moreover, the article develops a testable framework 
specifying the conditions under which brands are likely to respond, act collectively, and 
influence government for pro-worker change. It also offers novel insights by applying social 
movement lenses and casting brands as social movement actors.    
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Introduction 
On the 3
rd
 of January 2014, minimum-wage strikes were violently crushed by the military 
police, killing five garment workers and wounding more than thirty in Cambodia’s capital. 23 
union leaders and workers were detained for months without trial. This deadly incident widely 
covered by the international media provoked public outcries and calls to release the detained 
activists. A large group of brands and global union federations formed a united front and 
wrote joint letters and engaged in talks with the Cambodian government. After months of 
pressuring and brands’ credible threat of withdrawing orders, the detained activists were 
finally released.  
This episode illustrates how brands, often targeted by activists and the media as the culprit 
of sweatshop conditions, are increasingly acting as labour rights advocates vis-à-vis producer 
country governments. This phenomenon, which I call brand advocacy, is particularly 
interesting given that corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts to improve labour rights 
and conditions in global supply chains have known serious limitations. Scholars find that the 
progress made thanks to the CSR approach through codes of conduct and monitoring  has 
been largely limited to safety and health issues (Barrientos & Smith 2007, Bartley & Egels-
Zandén 2015), while it has failed to address workers’ right to organization and living wages 
(Anner 2012, Locke 2013, Egels-Zandén & Merk 2014). Moreover, the CSR approach to 
labour tends to address visible issues notably child labour while leaving fundamental 
conditions unchanged (Jamali et al. 2017).  
Scholars increasingly recognize that improving labor conditions in global supply chains 
requires a confluence of forces. Locke (2013) argues that private regulation has the best 
chance of succeeding when layered on and interacted with public regulation. Donaghey et al. 
(2014) argue that “symbiotic governance”, combining consumer power and labour power is 
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likely to drive progress in labour conditions in global supply chains. Similarly, Gereffi & Lee 
(2016) maintain that “synergistic governance”, or alliances of public, private, and social 
governance actors, offers a promising pathway for social and economic upgrading in global 
supply chains. Nonetheless, the conditions under which such layered, symbiotic, or 
synergistic governance emerges and the processes of how that works on the ground remain 
understudied. Scholars have examined complementarity between public and private labour 
regulation (Amengual 2010, Coslovsky & Locke 2013, Locke et al. 2013), interactions 
between state regulators and civil society actors (Distelhorst et al. 2015), as well as 
transnational solidarity networks (Rodriguez-Garavito 2005, Anner 2013). Although 
important, these efforts largely focus on the factory-level, limiting their reach and impact. 
Based on three cases of brands’ political intervention in Cambodia’s garment industry, this 
article shows that brand advocacy (i.e. pressuring a producer country government for pro-
worker action) is a new form of boomerang politics with potential to make sector-wide 
changes despite limitations. This study develops a conceptual framework and illustrates with 
case evidence that brand advocacy can prompt state to take pro-worker actions under certain 
circumstances: when brands perceive issue salience, when mobilization structures are in place, 
when political opportunities/contexts are favourable, and when there is resource dependence.  
This study makes important contributions to the literature both empirically and 
theoretically. Empirically, this is one of the first in-depth studies examining the advocacy role 
of brands in promoting labour rights and conditions vis-à-vis a producer country government. 
Theoretically, this article contributes a typology of boomerang politics in global supply chains 
and develops a conceptual framework specifying the conditions under which brands are likely 
to respond, act collectively, and influence a producer country government for pro-worker 
change. The novelty here is to cast brands as social movement actors rather than simple 
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targets and to show the relevance of social movement theory to the study of corporate 
activism.  
This article proceeds as follows. The next section discusses three types of boomerang 
politics and argues that brand advocacy represents a new boomerang pattern. The subsequent 
section develops a conceptual framework drawing on the theories of issue salience, social 
movements, and resource dependence. This is followed by a section outlining the context and 
method and a section examining three cases (crackdown, minimum wage increase, and trade 
union law). The article then summarizes the case evidence and concludes with broader 
implications. 
 
Varieties of boomerang politics  
One well-known form of governance involving public, private, and social actors is a 
“boomerang” pattern of influence. The original boomerang model developed by Keck & 
Sikkink (1998) posits that when domestic channels for expressing dissent and resolving 
demands are blocked, transnational alliances of civil society actors appeal foreign 
governments to intervene in the face of a recalcitrant domestic government. Keck & Sikkink’s 
state-centric boomerang model has been applied to corporate settings, where corporations 
have become the ultimate target of campaigns to save the rainforest (McAteer & Pulver 2009) 
and to address labour standard violations in global supply chains (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005, 
Rodriguez-Garavito 2005, Anner 2009 & 2013) among others. Given the variants, den Hond 
& de Bakker (2012) call the general pattern in which activist groups exert pressure on primary 
targets to influence the ultimate target as “boomerang politics”.  
The original boomerang model, where the ultimate pressure emanates from one state and 
gets applied to another state, can be termed state-to-state boomerang and is depicted in Figure 
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1. This pattern has also been present in the area of international labour standards. Trade 
agreements have provided channels for civil society actors to pressure buyer country 
governments to exert influence on producer governments. Notable examples are the US 
General System of Preferences (GSP), which provides preferential market access to a number 
of products from developing countries on a condition that the countries respect internationally 
recognized worker rights. Civil society actors have used GSP petitions exposing labour rights 
violations to put pressure on the US government trade representatives, which in turn exert 
pressure on trading partners (Anner 2013). Nonetheless, this trade instrument is not available 
in all countries and its effectiveness depends on the level of influence the US government can 
exert (Caraway 2010).  
---Insert Figure 1 about here--- 
In the past two decades, the target of activist pressure has shifted from state to firms, 
notably well-known brands and retailers of consumer goods, as global brands’ power and 
resources have come to overshadow those of the state (Seidman 2007, Soule 2009, Anner 
2013). While a general boomerang pattern targeting corporations has been called “corporate 
boomerang” (McAteer & Pulver 2009), such pattern in the area of labour in global supply 
chains has been specifically referred to as “brand boomerang”, given the pressure applied to 
brands (Bartley & Egels-Zandén 2016). Brand boomerang campaigns target brands and “use 
networks with external allies to create publicity and multiple points of pressure to spur 
remediation” (Ibid.: 243). Most often, this takes the form of local unions or NGOs 
cooperating with global union federations (GUFs) and/or international NGOs to mobilize 
pressures on brands to address labour standard violations in their supplier facilities. This 
pattern can be called brand-to-supplier boomerang and is shown in Figure 2. 
---Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
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Such brand-to-supplier boomerang pattern was made famous in the 2000s with high-profile 
cases in Latin America (e.g. Armbruster-Sandoval 2005, Rodriguez-Garavito 2005). More 
recently, this brand boomerang pattern has won important victories : transnational alliances of 
workers, unions, and activists have pressured US universities to cut licensing contracts and 
obliged athletic apparel giants like Adidas, Nike and Russell Corporation to cover the 
termination costs of their suppliers (Anner 2013). While brand boomerang campaigns are 
well-known in Latin America, this pattern is also present in Asia, notably in Indonesia 
(Bartley & Egels-Zandén 2016) and in Cambodia (Oka 2010). 
Despite some notable successes, brand boomerang campaigns for labour have their limits. 
Seemingly successful campaigns may end up in failure as unions may be forced to dissolve or 
factories close and move elsewhere. It is telling that two of the brand boomerang campaigns 
that achieved transformative gains in Indonesia both ended up in factory closures (Bartley & 
Egels-Zandén 2016). Inherently unstable and footloose nature of the garment and footwear 
industry made leveraging risky and gains rather limited (Ibid.). Even a successful brand-to-
supplier boomerang case is limited by its very nature of being ad-hoc and supply-chain 
specific, as the pressure is exercised by brands and placed on their suppliers, creating pockets 
of best practice in the vast sea of labour standard violations.  
There is another pattern of boomerang that leverages corporations but ultimately targets a 
state. Notable examples include the anti-Apartheid campaign (Seidman 2007) and the 
divestment campaign in Myanmar (den Hond & de Bakker 2012), where corporations doing 
business with a racist or an autocratic regime came under pressure and they in turn put 
pressure on those states. This type of boomerang targeting brands but ultimately pressuring a 
government is on the rise, particularly in the global garment industry. In this new breed, 
which can be called brand-to-state boomerang and is depicted in Figure 3, brands are 
simultaneously targets and advocates. One important difference from the divestment 
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campaign in Myanmar is that in brand-to-state boomerang, brands are actively engaging with 
the government and seeking to influence them rather than simply leaving the country.  
---Insert Figure 3 about here --- 
Such brand-to-state boomerang has received little scholarly attention. One of the rare 
exceptions, den Hond et al. (2014) study Clean Clothes Campaigns (CCC)’s urgent appeal 
mechanisms, where CCC receives requests from workers around the world to intervene and 
solve labour standard violations. They find that only 16 percent of the urgent appeals received 
are state-focused (e.g. labour laws, imprisonment, murder or harassment of labour activists) as 
opposed to factory-focused demands and conclude that state-focused appeals are less likely to 
be resolved given the systemic cause of the underlying conflict. Precisely because of the 
systemic nature of the issue it can handle, however, the brand-to-state boomerang pattern has 
potential to tackle fundamental problems that the supply-chain specific CSR approach has 
failed to address.  
 
Conceptual framework  
Scholars studying boomerang politics have sought to identify the circumstances under which 
cross-border alliances of civil society actors achieve their goals.  Keck & Sikkink (1998) 
found issue resonance, network density (of activists), and target vulnerability as important 
conditions for transnational advocacy networks to achieve leverage and influence outcomes. 
The cohesiveness and strengths of activist networks and vulnerability of targets are also found 
to be important for the success of corporate boomerang (McAteer & Pulver 2009) and for 
brand (-to-supplier) boomerang (Bartley & Egels-Zandén 2016). Nonetheless, few studies 
have examined the conditions under which corporations or brands act as advocates promoting 
change vis-a-vis government. Drawing on the theories of issue salience, social movements, 
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and resource dependence, this section develops a framework to help us understand when 
brands are likely to act collectively and exert influence over a state.    
Issue salience  
There is a growing scholarly consensus that a firm’s responsiveness to stakeholders is driven 
by issue salience (Bundy et al. 2013, Dutton & Jackson 1987, Eesley & Lenox 2006). Bundy 
et al. (2013: 353) define issue salience as “the degree to which a stakeholder issue resonates 
with and is prioritized by management”. The extant literature suggests that issue salience has 
both social and strategic dimensions, as firms are likely to act upon an issue when social 
expectations and normative pressures are important and when the issue is likely to 
significantly impact the business (e.g. Heath 1997, Lawrence & Weber 2014). Bundy et al. 
(2013) maintain that when a stakeholder’s issue resonates or conflicts with a firm’s 
organizational identity and/or strategic frame, the firm is likely to respond to the stakeholder’s 
issue in a substantive manner. Here, “…identity is related to organizational rhetoric and to the 
display of desired images, whereas strategic frames are related to calculative action aimed at 
achieving performance outcomes” (Bundy et al. 2013: 357). Thus, we can deem issue salience 
as consisting of image and performance dimensions, albeit their close link. 
In the area of labour practices in global supply chains, naming and shaming has been the 
dominant mechanism through which activists have raised the level of issue salience by putting 
brand images at risk (Klein 1999). Through associating brand names to undesirable images, 
media-savvy activists have often obtained concessions from brands (Anner 2013). Moreover, 
strategic factors directly affecting firm performance also heighten issue salience. For instance, 
disruption to supply chains caused by strikes or unrest delays delivery and hurts sales, directly 
impacting firm performance. In short, brands are likely to respond when they see the issue has 
important implications for their images and/or firm performance.  
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Mobilization structures and political opportunities 
The literature on social movements seeks to understand, inter alia, factors and conditions that 
enable social movement actors to challenge and influence mainstream institutions, 
traditionally governments but also increasingly corporations. The social movement theory has 
been applied to corporations facing stakeholder collective action (King 2008), NGO activism 
(den Hond & de Bakker 2013), and stakeholder alliances (Fassin et al. 2016), among others. 
While the theory has not been applied to corporations as social movement actors, the growing 
activist role of brands makes it relevant and appropriate. In particular, mobilizing structures 
and political opportunities are of relevance here.  
Mobilizing structures are the “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through 
which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996: 3). Mobilizing 
structures can be formal organizations or informal networks that facilitate collective action 
through providing a resource base, an arena for interaction thereby helping overcome the high 
starting cost (King 2008). This is relevant to the collection action of corporate actors as well; 
brands also need some kind of mobilizing structures to coordinate them and solve collective 
action problems. 
Political opportunities refer to the broader political environment that shapes opportunities 
and poses external constraints for social movements (Tarrow 1998, Tilly 1978). The degree of 
mobilization is likely to depend on the perceived opportunities in terms of political openings: 
favourable signals embolden social movements while unfavourable ones dampen their 
collective action (Tarrow 1998, Meyer & Minkoff 2004). On the other hand, the level of 
influence a movement can exert over the outcome is mediated by political contexts (Amenta 
2006).  Notably, the level of democratization and the nature of regime importantly affect the 
movement’s influence on the outcome (Tilly 1999).  Hence, brands’ collective action is 
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constrained as well as enabled by political opportunities whereas their influence on state is 
shaped by political contexts. 
Resource dependence 
According to Keck & Sikkink (1998: 29), the target’s vulnerability stems from “the 
availability of leverage and the target’s sensitivity to leverage”.  This aspect is well-captured 
by the resource dependence theory. Pfeffer & Salancik (1978: 51) define dependence as “the 
product of the importance of a given input or output to the organization and the extent to 
which it is controlled by a relatively few organizations”.  When the resource exchange is not 
equally important to both parties, the relationship becomes that of asymmetry, giving power 
to the less dependent party and allowing them to influence the behaviour of the more 
dependent one (Ibid.: 53). While the resource dependence theory was originally developed for 
inter and intra-organizational relationships, it has been widely applied to the CSR literature 
examining firm-stakeholder relationships (Frynas & Yamahaki 2016). Beyond its well-
recognized application to firms’ relationships with stakeholders (Frooman 1999, Julian et al. 
2008, den Hond et al. 2015), the resource dependence theory has relevance to firm-state 
relationships as well, especially in developing countries where firms are politically dependent 
on government for various resources (Gao & Hafsi 2017). 
When state is the ultimate target of boomerang campaigns, resources at stake can be 
financial (e.g. aid, trade, loans), military, or legitimacy (den Hond & de Bakker 2012). While 
some of these resource exchanges exist mainly between states (e.g. military), others can occur 
between states and corporations. Based on the Myanmar divestment case, den Hond & de 
Bakker (2012) conclude that the balance of power is tilted toward the state, since the state has 
concessions and orders to grant whereas firms face competition to win them. This is not 
always the case, however. In non-extractive industries, developing country governments go 
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extra lengths to entice foreign investment, providing tax and other incentives. When the 
exchange is not equally critical to the firms, as they can freely choose investment locations for 
instance, the relationship can be asymmetric, making the state more dependent on the firms.  
Figure 4 summarizes the three-stage model of firms’ response, collective action and 
influence based on the above discussion. In the first phase, brands act upon issue salience in 
terms of impact on their images and performance. Subsequently, mobilization structures 
consisting of formal organizations and informal networks affect the extent of collective action. 
The likelihood of firms’ collective action is also shaped by perceived political opportunities. 
Lastly, firms’ influence on state policy and action is mediated by the political context and the 
nature of resource dependence between the state and the firms.  
---Figure 4 about here--- 
    
Context and Method 
To study a brand-to-state boomerang pattern and brand advocacy more in general, the most 
important criterion for case selection is the sheer presence of brands’ political engagement. In 
the last few years, Cambodia counts at least three incidents of brand advocacy surrounding the 
crackdown in 2014, minimum wage negotiations in 2015, and the trade union law in 2016, 
making it a fertile ground to study brand advocacy.
1
  
Demands for external alliances and interventions arise when civil society actors face a 
recalcitrant domestic government (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Democracy in Cambodia remains 
severely flawed despite periodic elections, making it “electoral authoritarianism” (McCargo 
2005, Hughes & Un 2013). The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen has 
consolidated power over the past two decades, shunning oppositions outside and within the 
party. Hughes & Un (2013: 10) describe the regime as “…authoritarian, corrupt, and based 
heavily upon neo-patrimonial institutions, whose survival and expansion represent key 
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interests driving, and limiting, public policy”. Labour under this regime is framed “as a 
commodity to serve the political and wealth accumulation interests of ruling elites, but also as 
a problem to be managed through semi-authoritarian modes of governance aiming to maintain 
order and stability” (Ward & Mouyly 2015: 261).  
 
Anner (2015) argues workers are likely to resort to cross-border solidarity campaigns when 
labour is controlled by repressive employers. In Cambodia, labour (independent union 
movement in particular) is repressed by the state and employers with threats of legal actions 
and physical intimidation (Arnold 2014). About 95 percent of exporting garment factories are 
owned by foreign investors, most of whom are overseas Chinese, and they are cohesively 
organized through the Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia (GMAC), rendering 
their collective action effective (Ear 2013). In the aftermath of the violent crackdown, the 
GMAC not only threw support for the military intervention but also encouraged filing 
lawsuits against six independent union federations for inciting violence and inflicting damage 
on their properties. Such repressive approach of the state and employers drives labour 
activists to seek external alliances and interventions.  
Brand advocacy requires the presence of brands willing to assume a political role vis-à-vis 
government. Cambodia has a long and rich history of brands’ engagement given the ILO’s 
presence. The ILO monitoring programme, which grew out of the 1999 US-Cambodia Textile 
and Garment Trade Agreement, was renamed as Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) in 2005 
and served as the blueprint for the Better Work programme (Oka 2014). On numerous 
occasions, BFC has served as a forum for brands to engage and collaborate with each other as 
well as with other stakeholders (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, the garment industry needs to account for an important part of the economy 
for a group of brands to wield influence. In Cambodia, garment export accounts for about 
15 % of GDP and 85 % of the country’s export, and nearly 90 % of Cambodia’s garment 
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export is sourced by brands and retailers from Europe and the US (Ministry of Commerce). 
For instance, Gap and H&M are some of the most important buyers sourcing from Cambodia. 
Thus, European and American brands hold important leverage not only vis-à-vis supplier 
factories but also in relation to the Cambodian government. While such high degree of 
dependence on foreign brands is also seen in other garment producing countries such as 
Bangladesh and Jordan, it is unlikely in large countries such as in China and Indonesia that do 
not depend on a single industry. In sum, these conditions in the Cambodian garment industry 
make it a rich experimental ground for brands’ political engagement and collective action.  
Although this qualitative research focuses on events in one country, it is not a single-case 
study, as it examines three episodes of brand advocacy. These three incidents can be 
considered as “within-case observations” providing “within-case variation” (Gerring 2007: 
19-21) to illustrate the contours of brand advocacy. By focusing on within-case analysis and 
holding the macro institutional context more or less constant, it enables us to delve into other 
fine-grained factors that enable or hinder brand advocacy vis-à-vis government. 
This study is based on qualitative analysis of local newspaper articles as well as interviews 
of key individuals closely involved in the events. The author systematically searched two 
daily newspapers (the Daily Cambodia and the Phnom Penh Post) that closely follow 
developments in Cambodia’s garment industry. In total, 138 relevant articles were retrieved 
for the period between November 2014 and June 2016. In addition, twelve interviews were 
conducted during 2016-17 with four labour activists (of which three based in Cambodia and 
one in the US), five representative of international brands (of which two headquartered in 
Germany, two in the UK, and one in the US), one advisor to the Cambodian government, one 
former official of an intergovernmental organization, and one representative of a multi-
stakeholder initiative.
2 
All the interviewees were closely involved in at least one and mostly 
all of the episodes under investigation. Given the sensitive nature of the topic, the 
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interviewees were assured anonymity. All the interviews except one were recorded, 
transcribed, and analysed. 
Figure 5 summarizes the iterative process of data collection and analysis, inspired by 
Egels-Zandén et al. (2015). In the first instance, the newspaper articles were used to 
understand and describe the chronological development of the three episodes and to identify 
key actors. Subsequently, document analysis was conducted to identify important themes or 
first-order description surrounding the three events. Based on this initial analysis, interview 
questions were devised to delve deeper into the processes and mechanisms. Structured 
interviews covered the role of the interviewees and other key actors in each episode, their 
views on why and when brands collectively lobbied the government, as well as broader 
opportunities and challenges for brands’ role in promoting labour rights and living wages. The 
interview data helped refine the initial themes while adding new ones.  
The analysis of the interview data revealed three distinct phases in each case: brands’ 
initial responses to the event, presence or absence of collective action, and their influence on 
the government. Through coding process, it became apparent that different issue 
characteristics led to variable responses by brands. Moreover, interview data pointed to the 
importance of some kind of coordinating mechanisms, both organizational and interpersonal, 
in nurturing coherence and helping overcome brands’ collective action problems. Ultimately 
though, the level of influence brands exert on the government hinged upon the political 
context and power asymmetry between the government and brands. These identified themes 
were initially labelled as issue characteristics, coordinating mechanisms, political context, and 
power asymmetry. These categories were further refined based on the theories of issue 
salience, social movements, and resource dependence to yield the conceptual framework 
provided earlier. The next section examines the three cases based on the three-stage model of 
firms’ response, collective action, and influence. 
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Violent Crackdown 
As shown in the opening, several days of nationwide strikes organized by independent union 
federations ended violently as the military police shot at stone throwing striking garment 
workers on the 3
rd
 of January 2014, leaving five dead and wounding more than thirty. 
Moreover, 23 independent union leaders and workers were detained without trial for months. 
This deadly incident widely covered by the international media provoked public outcries and 
calls to release the detained activists.   
Brand Response 
Faced with the deadly violence in one of their key supply bases, brands saw an urgent need to 
intervene. A former official of an intergovernmental organization recalls: “buyers started 
really freaking out…we had so many buyers calling us saying ‘what shall we do?’” Violent 
repression arouses strong feelings among the public and tarnishes brands’ images. As an 
independent union federation leader put it, “customers in the West don’t want to buy t-shirts 
with workers’ blood on it” (Kasztelan 2014). 
It was not only brands’ images but also their smooth operation that came under pressure as 
the widespread unrest disrupted production on a large scale. The GMAC estimates the cost of 
strike to be $200 million in lost sales. The Chairman of the GMAC said “risky business” is 
what high street brands don’t like, worrying that brands may stop sourcing from Cambodia 
because of future strikes (Kasztelan 2014). Given the fast-moving nature of the industry 
subject to fleeting trends, disruption to production leading to late (or no) deliveries is likely to 
hit brands’ sales and performance. One brand representative explains,  
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When all the riots happened in Cambodia, there's no point in not paying those people, if 
there's no product, you're not going to make any profit anyway. So, stability is now part 
and parcel of where the brands are looking.  
Thus, brands perceived the crackdown as undoubtedly highly salient both in terms of their 
images and operations. Initial reactions do not automatically translate to collective action and 
influence, however.  
Brand Collective Action 
Just a few days after the incident, a group of seven brands took initiative to write a letter 
condemning violence. The letter was signed by Adidas, Columbia, Gap, H&M, Inditex, Levi, 
and Puma. A representative of one of the signatory brands recounts, “We, through our close 
network, agreed to write a letter…because of the extreme nature of what they’ve done. So, 
that action was done very quickly”. Such spontaneous and swift collective action was made 
possible by the pre-existing interpersonal network. “Cambodia has a long history of 
engagement because of the Better Work Programme. Many of the brands in the compliance 
area know each other very well, regularly in communication with each other”, explains the 
brand representative 
Nonetheless, the initial letter did not attract a large mass of brands. According to a former 
official, collaboration on a larger scale was hampered by brand rivalry. “So that didn’t get a 
lot of traction”. As a neutral broker, BFC took initiative to coordinate buyers to agree on a 
common text for a joint letter. In late January, 27 international buyers and three global union 
federations sent a joint letter to the Prime Minister, expressing “grave concern” over the fatal 
shooting, demanding immediate investigation into the killings and the release of detained 
activists and workers. The signatory buyers made up about 85 percent of Cambodia’s export, 
according to one estimate (Teehan 2014). 
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The first joint letter was followed up by a visit of brand representatives. “By then, there 
were a lot of letters sent from the buyers to the government. So the group decided that it had 
to be followed up at least by a visit and it should be part of the ongoing dialogue”, recounts a 
former official. During the first visit, “they (brands) were pleasantly surprised when there 
were several ministers and it wasn’t just hand shaking and meaningless”. Nonetheless, the 
government continued to detain activists even after the first visit.  
In May 2014, the same group of 30 international buyers and union federations issued a 
second joint statement saying that “due to reaction of consumers and the disruptions to 
production and shipping caused by continued unrest, Cambodia was at risk of losing its status 
as a strategic sourcing market” (Phorn & Zsombor 2014). This statement makes it clear that 
brands are concerned about the incident’s impact on their images (reaction of consumers) and 
operations (disruptions to production). From the second letter and visit, the Ethical Trading 
Initiative (ETI), a UK multi-stakeholder initiative took over the coordinating role from BFC. 
Brand influence  
While several joint letters were sent and meetings organized, what proved decisive appears to 
be a credible threat of brands withdrawing from Cambodia. The representative who led the 
buyer delegation recounts as follows:  
But we didn't do it saying unless you do this, we’re going to pull out. But actually one of 
the… jeans companies … said last year we bought two million pairs of jeans; this year 
we’re buying half a million pairs. You saw the instant change. 
Labour activists confirm the immediate impact as the detained activists were released a 
few days after Levi’s communicated its withdraw of orders. In addition to Levi’s, H&M made 
clear its intention of reducing orders from Cambodia, following campaigns and protests 
organized by labour activists in front of H&M shops in the US and Sweden. Nonetheless, a 
brand representative knowledgeable about the local politics cautions against directly 
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attributing the government decision to one brand’s action, given multiple voices denouncing 
the crackdown. 
In terms of political opportunity, the crackdown occurred against the backdrop of political 
tensions and contestations. The minimum wage strikes formed part of a broader protest 
movement led by the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) and joined by 
different streams of protesters, demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister, fresh 
elections, and higher wages among others. Threatened by the convergence of discounted 
forces, the government ordered military police to intervene. While the regime was certainly 
not opening, it was coming under stress.  
Sustained international pressure and credible threats by brands prompted the Cambodian 
government to release 23 independent union leaders and workers detained for months without 
trial. Nonetheless, six leaders of independent union federations have been charged for inciting 
violence and they remain under judicial supervision, restricting their right to organize and 
campaign. Moreover, there has been no genuine investigation into the killing and no official 
compensation made to the people died.  
In sum, this episode illustrates the conceptual framework and underscores key factors. First, 
issue salience both in terms of image and performance prompted brands to act swiftly. Second, 
mobilization structures, both in terms of informal network and formal organizations (i.e. BFC 
and the ETI) played important roles in coordinating brands and facilitating their collective 
action. Third, political context was more fluid and unstable in the aftermath of the mass 
protests. Above all, what proved decisive for brand influence appears to be their credible 
threat to withdraw from Cambodia.  
 
Minimum wage negotiations 
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The protests that led to the deadly crackdown in January 2014 centred on the minimum wage 
deal hammered out by the government in December 2013. While independent unions 
demanded $160 per month (double the $80 minimum wage rate back then), the government 
unilaterally set the garment industry’s 2014 minimum wage initially at $95 and then at $100. 
Unions rebuffed it and workers continued to strike and protest en masse, which abruptly 
ended in violence. The minimum wage negotiations continued against the backdrop of fear 
and heightened security, and in November 2014, after rounds of negotiations with the industry 
and union representatives, the government decided $128 as the minimum wage for 2015.  
Brand Response 
During the run-up to the minimum wage negotiation in 2014, brands came under mounting 
pressure from organized labour, both local and global, to take responsibility for what they call 
“starvation wages”. In the autumn of 2014, minimum wage hike campaigns shifted its target 
from the Cambodian government and garment factories to brands. Rallying workers started 
carrying banners saying “Gap starves Cambodian workers” and the like (Pech & Teehan 
2014). Union federations delivered strongly worded petitions to local offices of brands such 
as H&M, C&A, and M&S. This local action was supported by their international solidarity 
networks on “Global Days of Action”, as IndustriALL, Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU) and North American Labor Union Workers United organized protests in front 
of the brands’ shops (e.g. Gap, H&M) in multiple countries calling for a minimum wage 
increase (Teehan et al. 2014).
  
Strong local mobilization coordinated with global campaigns led by GUFs enhanced issue 
salience for the targeted brands as their images came under pressure. Nonetheless, issue 
salience was not as heightened as in the case of repression: violence clearly threatens brands’ 
images and disrupts operations, whereas wages have mixed implications on performance. 
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Indeed, higher wages are not necessarily compatible with the business models of brands 
sourcing from Cambodia often based on low costs. Such mixed implications for firm 
performance explain why brands did not react in a concerted and determined manner as in the 
aftermath of the crackdown.  
Brand Collective Action 
While brands are traditionally unwilling to discuss distributive issues, a few brands sourcing 
from Cambodia expressed their willingness to increase the price they pay. Just one day after 
the first Global Day of Action and weeks before the minimum wage decision, eight major 
brands and retailers (i.e.  C&A, H&M, Inditex, Primark, Next, New Look, N Brown Group 
and Tchibo) wrote to the Cambodian government and GMAC pledging that they would pay 
more for Cambodian-made garments if workers were to be paid more.
 
Specifically, the letter 
says “As responsible business our purchasing practices will enable the payment of a fair 
living wage and increased wages will be reflected in our FOB prices” (Sourcing Journal 2014). 
This was an unprecedented move of major brands coming together and promising in 
writing they would adjust the cost of the supply chain to reflect higher wages. While H&M 
had experimented with a living wage pilot project in Cambodia, its web statement says that 
“A collaborative approach is crucial and that is why we today, together with other brands, 
have sent a letter to the Cambodian government and the GMAC to clarify our shared position 
and intention in the upcoming wage negotiations in Cambodia (Ibid.)”. It is clear from this 
H&M statement that the pledge was aimed at influencing the government decision.    
It is worth noting that all the eight brands that made pledge are ETI members. While it was 
not the ETI itself that coordinated this particular action, it was enabled by a closely knit 
community of ETI brands, according to one brand representative. As for the ILO, not just 
BFC but also the ILO country office based in Bangkok actively promoted higher minimum 
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wages and urged global buyers to pay more. Not only did the ILO issued statements calling on 
all buyers to pay more but also provided technical expertise showing brands concretely how 
much they needed to pay more to accommodate the minimum wage rise.
3
   
Nevertheless, the vast majority of brands did not join in making the pledge. Notably, key 
US names (e.g. Gap, Levi’s, Walmart) were missing. Labour activists and experts concur that 
European buyers in general are more progressive and easy to work with compared to 
American buyers, who tend to shun anything that can be legally binding.   
Brand influence  
While the minimum wage still lags behind a living wage, it made great strides in just two 
years from $80 to $128, which further rose to $140 in 2016 despite vehement opposition from 
the GMAC. While it is difficult to ascertain the level of influence the brand pledge had on the 
government decision, it appears to be mixed at best. One labour activist says the brand pledge 
that came just before the government decision had some impact, while the former official says 
it did not really have an impact because buyers did not follow through.  
Even if the initial brand pledge had some impact on the government decision, subsequent 
pledges of similar nature are likely to have lost credibility, given that the promise of higher 
prices remains largely unfulfilled. 99 percent of the GMAC member factories surveyed in late 
2015 reportedly received the same prices from their buyers as the year before or less 
(Zsombor 2015). A local labour activist and a Cambodian government official call brands’ 
action “propaganda”, as almost all brands have failed to deliver on their promise.  
A more probable cause for the substantial wage hike was the mass mobilization that 
threatened the regime and obliged the government to placate workers, opening a crack in the 
political opportunity structure. As a former official recounts, “There was that huge rally led 
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by CNRP and workers. That really scared the government…for the wage increase, that made 
a difference”.  
In sum, this episode shows the importance of issue salience in getting brands to respond. 
Even when the mobilization structures (i.e. informal network, the ILO) were well in place, the 
mixed implications of wage increases on firm performance meant that only a handful of 
brands were willing to make pledge and even fewer actually made good on the pledge. 
Moreover, the episode shows that brand influence is mediated by the political context and 
mobilization of other actors, notably workers and unions at the local as well as the global 
levels.     
 
Trade Union Law 
In Cambodia, the trade union law setting out rules for forming, running, and dissolving unions 
has been in preparation for nearly a decade. During 2011-13, the draft went through rounds of 
revisions with significant inputs from civil society actors, dropping most of the provisions 
deemed unacceptable by labour activists and the ILO. In the run-up to the 2013 election, 
however, the Cambodian government shelved the draft law, preferring to avoid controversy. 
In 2014, the trade union law was suddenly revived following the violent crackdown. To the 
surprise of unions and NGOs, the revived version ignored the rounds of revisions undertaken.  
The government re-inserted anti-union provisions, made few concessions, and rushed to 
pass the trade union law in April 2016. Despite vehement opposition from independent unions, 
the government remained adamant on the strike threshold, requiring support from just over 
half of union members to call a legal strike. The government also remained firm on eligibility 
criteria for union leaders (i.e. lack of any criminal charges), deemed to conflict with the ILO 
conventions. Perhaps most alarmingly, the law gives the court power to dissolve unions if any 
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one of its leaders is found to violate the law. As one labour activist puts it, “The ability to 
dissolve unions is insanity. They (the government) can dissolve anything that they want for 
any reasons that they want”. 
Brand Response 
Only a few brands responded prior to the forceful passage of the revised trade union law. As 
the revived draft union law was circulated very late in the process and key independent union 
federation leaders were handicapped by the pending charges, there was little mobilization on 
the part of workers and unions. One union organizer describes as follows: 
The government was very smart in the sense that they didn’t allow any drafts to go around. 
So nobody knew the actual contents of the law. There were no public consultations... The 
strategy of the government was to alienate various union leaders who had charges pending.  
 
International social actors notably Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), the International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC) and IndustriALL tried to engage international brands. ITUC 
made public detailed comments sent to the Cambodian government clearly outlining 
problematic articles of the draft union law. During the parliamentary debate on the trade union 
law, CCC together with other labour activist organizations issued an open letter to all brands 
sourcing from Cambodia, urging them to issue a public support statement for a trade union 
law fully respecting the ILO conventions “as a condition for future sourcing from the 
country (bold original)” (CCC 2016). 
Most brands remained silent as the trade union law passed the National Assembly in April 
2016. This relative silence and lack of interest among brands stood in stark contrast to the 
aftermath of the crackdown. One CCC coordinator said “we are really puzzled as to why they 
[brands] are so quiet on this issue that will affect workers all over the country—taking into 
consideration they have been talking loudly on other issues like higher wages for garment 
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workers” (Baliga et al. 2016). This can be explained by the nature of issue as one brand 
representative explains: 
When it comes to law…At the government affairs [department] level, they go, do we 
really want to write a letter about the trade union law to the government? The government 
affairs’ person may say, it’s not really critical for us to have a voice on this topic. 
Brand Collective Action 
For the trade union law, there was no collective action of brands but only sporadic individual 
responses. In response to the call from NGOs and unions, four brands (i.e. Levi’s, H&M, 
Inditex, Primark) separately issued public statements in support of a trade union law that 
respects ILO conventions, but these public statements came in too late in the process and did 
not mention whether and how the law would affect their sourcing decisions.  
In this episode, there was no formal mobilization structure to coordinate or facilitate brands’ 
collective action. Although the ILO was described as a facilitator in the other two cases, all 
the local labour activists interviewed criticized the ILO for taking the side of the government 
by working secretively with them and not releasing the drafts before it was too late. 
The degree of mobilization is also affected by the political opportunities perceived by 
brands. Just like social movement organizations, brands seem to calculate the likelihood of 
success and act when their actions are likely to have an impact given the circumstances. One 
brand representative explains that few brands took action because they knew their voice 
would not be heeded:  
We all know that the driver of that trade union law was a very much domestic issue. 
Domestic political issue. And we weren’t going to change that. We cannot change the 
make-up of the power structure in Cambodia. 
 
Brand Influence 
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The question is whether the outcome would have been different, had more brands been 
mobilized. Although we cannot answer this counter-factual question with a high degree of 
certainty, it is reasonable to conjecture that the government would not have made much 
concession given the political context. This time more than ever, the government was 
determined to tighten the grip on civil society, notably vocal independent union federations 
and NGOs. According to one union organizer, 
In its analysis of why the election in 2013 was so close or perhaps why they [the ruling 
party] even lost it, they determined that they wanted not only to attack the opposition but 
also to attack the civil society, limit, and constrain it…The trade union law is not about 
labour relations but a way to control independent union movement. 
While there were minor openings right after the mass demonstrations followed by the 
crackdown, by the time the trade union law was passed, the ruling party had quelled the 
opposition and repressed the civil society, closing windows of opportunity. 
In sum, this episode illustrates the limit of leveraging brands when issue salience is limited 
and the political context is unfavourable. Limited mobilization of workers and lack of 
immediacy felt by brands meant that few brands were willing to act. Moreover, brand 
leverage is not a panacea in the face of a government determined to stifle any countervailing 
power.  
 
Discussion  
In Cambodia, brand advocacy had a major impact on releasing the detained activists, a minor 
influence on the minimum wage increase, and no influence on the trade union law. Table 1 
summarizes the three cases according to the three-stage model. When the issue has 
immediacy, involving extreme violence or tragic events, more brands are compelled to 
respond. When the issue has mixed implications on firm performance as in the case of a 
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minimum wage hike, fewer brands respond. When the issue is not deemed sufficiently salient 
(i.e. trade union law), even fewer brands respond.  
---Insert Table 1 about here--- 
The extent to which brands act collectively also depends on mobilization structures, both 
formal coordinating organizations and informal networks. Cambodia’s garment industry has 
become an experimental ground for brand advocacy because of the ILO programme that 
brought together a group of brands to collaborate. The ETI also played a key role in creating a 
core of committed brands through regular meetings and exchanges. Such credible 
organizations assuming coordinating roles facilitate collective action of a larger number of 
brands. Through these collaborative platforms, brand representatives have come to form 
informal networks, enabling more spontaneous collective action. 
Furthermore, brands’ mobilization and influence are circumscribed by political 
opportunities and contexts on the ground. The mass mobilization of workers and the 
convergence of opposition forces shook the regime and created political openings, providing 
opportunities for brands to intervene in helping release detained activists and raise the 
minimum wage. By the time the government mooted the trade union law, however, the regime 
had stifled the opposition and consolidated power, dampening brands’ prospects for 
influencing the government. 
Ultimately, the level of influence brands can exert on the government hinges upon the 
degree of leverage brands are willing to exercise and the country’s dependence on brands. In 
the aftermath of the crackdown, one brand withdrew orders while multiple brands made 
explicit their intentions to reconsider sourcing from Cambodia, signalling a credible threat. 
This is arguably the most important leverage brands have vis-à-vis producer governments. For 
minimum wage negotiations, a group of eight brands made pledge to increase the price they 
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pay to factories (though few made good on the pledge). As for the trade union law, none of 
the brands that wrote letters made an explicit link to their sourcing decisions.  
Overall, the three cases examined above illustrate and support the conceptual framework, 
which posits that brands’ action and influence are contingent upon issue salience, 
mobilization structures, political opportunities/contexts, and resource dependence. Although 
brand advocacy vis-à-vis government has potential to effect more broad-based changes than 
the supply chain-specific CSR approach or brand-to-supplier boomerang, the chances of 
satisfying these conditions may be slim. Moreover, we need to be cautious not to overestimate 
brand influence and underestimate worker agency; the massive mobilization of workers was 
critical to making the government receptive to raise minimum wages. As Amengual and 
Chirot (2016) show in their study of transnational and state labour regulation in Indonesia, 
worker mobilization targeting the state creates public contestation and prompts the state to 
take pro-labour actions. 
 
Conclusion 
Given the inherent limitations of the CSR approach to labour in global supply chains, scholars 
increasingly call for a combination of public, private, and social forces to improve labour 
conditions in global supply chains (Locke 2013, Donaghey et al. 2014; Gereffi & Lee 2014). 
Nonetheless, we still know little about the conditions, processes, as well as the impact of such 
confluence of forces on labour rights and conditions beyond the factory-level. This paper has 
addressed this gap by focusing on a new breed of brand boomerang (brand-to-state 
boomerang), developing a conceptual framework for brand advocacy, and examining the 
conditions under which brands come together to lobby government in favour of better rights 
and conditions for workers. 
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The study has shown both promise and limits of brand advocacy. On one hand, brand 
advocacy can address sector-wide issues that cannot be dealt with by the CSR approach of 
individual brands. When the level of issue salience is high, impacting brand images and firm 
performance, brands are likely to act in a concerted and determined manner, as we saw after 
the crackdown. On the other hand, brand advocacy faces severe constraints when issue 
salience is limited and political opportunities/contexts are unfavourable, as in the case of the 
trade union law. Indeed, when the government is determined to stay in power and to stifle any 
independent or opposition movements, even powerful brands have difficulty making their 
voices heard. 
This article makes important contributions to the literature on labour in global supply 
chains. Empirically, this is one of the first studies examining the advocacy role of brands in 
promoting labour rights and conditions vis-à-vis a producer country government. On the 
theoretical front, this study contributes a typology of boomerang politics and develops a 
testable conceptual framework specifying the conditions under which brands are likely to 
respond, act collectively, and influence government for pro-worker change. While this article 
does not explicitly test the propositions given the limited cases, future studies can test and 
refine the framework based on broader empirical evidence. 
Moreover, this study has broader implications on the literature on corporations and 
activism (den Hond & de Bakker 2007, Yaziji & Doh 2009, den Hond et al. 2015). Recently, 
there is growing interest in “corporate-sponsored activism” or an activist role of corporations 
(e.g. Walker and Rea 2014, McDonnell 2015). Yet, corporate advocacy vis-à-vis host country 
government in favour of pro-worker change has attracted little scholarly attention so far. By 
casting corporations as social movement actors rather than simple targets and showing the 
relevance of social movement theory to the study of corporate activism, this study offers fresh 
empirical and theoretical insights to the literature.  
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One of the limitations of this study is that the phenomenon studied is limited to one 
industry in one country. The global garment industry represents one of the most exposed and 
scrutinized industries, shaped by more than two decades of contestation among various actors 
(Bartley 2007). This makes garment brands more sensitive to labour issues in global supply 
chains, compared to firms in other industries. Although Cambodia’s history of brands’ 
engagement and susceptibility to brand pressure make it somewhat unique, the phenomenon 
of brand advocacy is spreading in other countries. In Bangladesh, a group of brands 
threatened to boycott the Dhaka apparel summit in February 2017 in response to the 
government crackdown on striking workers demanding higher wages. Moreover, a group of 
brands have spearheaded Action, Collaboration and Transformation (ACT) initiative to 
promote industry-level collective bargaining in several garment producing countries 
(Alexander et al. 2017).  This involves brands advocating industry-level collective bargaining 
vis-à-vis host country governments; another indication that brand advocacy is becoming more 
common and important. By shedding light on the hitherto neglected advocacy role of brands 
in producer countries, this study seeks to open up a new research agenda.   
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Notes 
1. There were examples of brand advocacy prior to this. As early as in 2005, a group of 
brands played a key role in pressuring the Cambodian government to release five 
detained activists (Ear 2013).    
2. One interview was conducted via email communication. Two of the twelve interviews 
were undertaken as part of the Garment Supply Chain Governance Project 
(www.garmentgov.de), and I thank the collaborators for allowing me to use quotes 
from the two interviews.  
3. The ILO estimates showed that supporting the new minimum wage of USD 128 would 
require global brands to increase the prices they pay to Cambodian factories by up to 
3.0 percent (ILO 2015).   
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Figure1.  State-to-state boomerang  
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Figure 2.  Brand-to-supplier boomerang  
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Figure 4. Three-stage model of firms’ response, collective action, and influence
 
Figure 3 Brand-to-state boomerang  
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Table 1. Summary of the three cases based on the three-stage model  
  
Case 
Issue 
Salience 
Response 
Mobilization 
Structure 
     Collective Action 
Political Opportunity/ 
Context 
Outcome (Influence) 
        
I Crackdown High Immediate and 
concerted 
ILO, ETI 
Collective and 
 credible threat  Regime instability Release of detained activists 
    
(27 brands) 
 
(major influence) 
        II Minimum wage Medium Variable ILO, ETI Collective pledge  Regime instability Substantial minimum wage increase 
     
(8 brands) 
 
(minor influence) 
        III Trade union law Low Mostly silent --- Individual statements Regime consolidation Forceful adoption of law undermining FoA 
           (4 brands)   (no influence)  
Note: Given the limited space, resource dependence is omitted from the above table as it remains unchanged across the three cases.   
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